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In these first years of the twenty-first century, we areunderstandably less sanguine and more skeptical thanW E H Lecky about the possibilities of progress for
humanity. A decade after he died in the reassuring inner
sanctum of his book-lined library, the calm certitudes of
his Victorian era were shattered by the sudden violence of
the First World War. All these years later, in the aftermath
of two world wars, in the wake of the Holocaust, and in the
shadow of the mushroom cloud, Lecky would perhaps
understand the doubts of those today who are less hopeful
than he was about the prospects for human progress.
Lecky observed once that, with societies and with eras,
there is a “hidden bias of the imagination” that affects the
course of events. He believed that there are certain
unstated predispositions of civilizations and of times that
have a far greater impact on the climate of opinion, and
thus on the flow of events, than any display of logic. He
believed, too, that this same observation applies equally to
individuals. I think he was right. And I am persuaded that,
as Lecky no doubt would have acknowledged, this
observation applies equally to Lecky himself.
Lecky was imbued with the belief in progress that was
characteristic of the Victorian era. He believed in progress
because – although he was a rationalist who wrote about
the virtues of rationalism – he retained nevertheless the
prevailing Victorian belief in God’s will. He had faith that
Providence was guiding the evolution of humanity toward
an ever-larger circle. He was confident that tomorrow
would be better than today, because he thought that
tomorrow would take us ever closer to the true morality of
a true humanity.
Lecky described himself as “half vagabond, half
bookworm.” He lived with books, and, to a great extent, he
lived in books. He travelled primarily to go to libraries,
and, when at home in London, he spent much of his time
in his library. When he finally entered Parliament late in
life, he complained that politics was an interruption of his
lifelong devotion to books and literature. Lecky was the
kind of man who corrected the page proofs of his latest
book while on his honeymoon. (Lecky’s obliging wife – a
“lady-in-waiting” to Queen Sophia of the Netherlands –
evidently tolerated that; my wife, Rebecca, who is not fond
of waiting, would not.)
In all his Victorian bookishness, Lecky could not imagine
a world in which humanity would not progress. As Donal
McCartney has put it, Lecky’s books, including the history
of European morals in which he gave voice to his view of
the ever-enlarging circle of humanity, were “written by one
who held a firm belief in the idea of progress. The general
theme of the books might be said to have been the story of
the gradual triumph of rationalism, liberty and tolerance in
European history. There could be no going back on these
advances. It had never once crossed Lecky’s mind that
there could be any retrogression to persecution and
intolerance in Western civilization.”
Lecky wrote confidently: “Liberty, industry and peace
are in modern societies indissolubly connected, and their
ultimate ascendancy depends upon a movement which may
be retarded, but cannot be arrested.” We know better. For
all our occasional inclinations toward triumphalism, for all
our considerable confidence in the manifest potential of
both democracy and capitalism, for all our wishful thinking
about the “ultimate ascendancy” of all our many hopes for
humanity, we definitely know better. The years since Lecky
left us have taught us only too well that progress toward a
wider circle of humanity is by no means assured. It
definitely can be arrested.
NEED TO EXPAND THE CIRCLE
Yet this is all the more reason for us to try to expand the
size of our circle. This is all the more reason for us to
broaden our “range of duty” in order to broaden the sweep
of human concern and, thereby, the scope of human
morality. This is all the more reason for us to use human 3
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morality to help us achieve human progress. Here in the
twenty-first century, I, for one, do not have the absolute
certainty that Lecky had in the nineteenth century about
the “ultimate ascendancy” of humanity through continued
human progress. The American mind of my time is not the
Victorian mind of his time. I have other hidden biases of
the imagination. Even so, I choose to imagine the
possibility of human progress. More important, I have
chosen to spend my life working to make what I can
imagine for the world a living reality in the world. That is
what brought me – and what brought others who share my
stubbornly optimistic view – to the round table of the
Appellate Body of the WTO.
The cosmologists, like the poet, say that, eons from now,
the world will end with a whimper, and not with a bang (T
S Eliot, “The Hollow Men,” in Oscar Williams, ed, Immortal
Poems of the English Language (New York: Washington Square
Press, 1952) 539, 542). I do not presume to know if they
are right. It is not for me to foresee the completion of the
human effort in this world. Like Lecky, I trust Providence
to tend to our ultimate fate. For my part, I am far more
interested in what will happen between now and then to
those who live in the world that Providence has entrusted
to us. And I am far more interested in fulfilling my own
range of duty in the ongoing human effort.
Progress can sometimes be hard to see. While
researching once in a library in Paris, Lecky found the
minute scrawl of the fabled French diplomat Talleyrand so
microscopic that he had to use a magnifying glass to read
it. Similarly, sometimes it may seem that we need a
magnifying glass to see the crawl of human progress toward
Lecky’s enlarged circle. The failures of international
dispute settlement are featured in dying color on the
bleeding broadcasts of CNN. The successes of
international dispute settlement are written in boring black
and white in the tedious pages of WTO reports.
Hard as it may sometimes be to discern, human progress
is nevertheless possible. We need not be Victorian “men of
letters” to believe that tomorrow can be better than today.
But, to make progress, we must first be able to see the
possibility of progress, and, to see it, we must first be able
to imagine it. We must change the hidden biases of our
imagination.
In trade, we have imagined progress. This helps explain
why there is a WTO. In other areas, we have not yet done
so. This helps explain much else. This helps explain, for
example, why so many of the nations of the world are only
now beginning to see the need for strengthening the
authority and the capability of the World Health
Organization in dealing with SARS, AIDS, and other global
epidemic diseases that do not respect artificial political
borders. This helps explain also why we have failed thus far
to make concerted multilateral efforts to protect and
preserve the world’s environment comparable to those that
we have made to expand the world’s trade. There are, of
course, numerous other equally compelling examples that
I might use to illustrate all the other ways in which our
imagination falls short of our genuine global need. Alas,
there are far too many examples of where we are not yet
meeting an urgent global need because we do not yet see it.
The right answer for the world is the approach we have
taken to finding the right answers at the round table of the
Appellate Body of the WTO. Conversation. Deliberation.
Mutual criticism. And, as a result, mutual trust. The right
approach, in other words, is what Mill and Lecky and
Rawls would all call “reasonableness.” The only way to
human progress is through human freedom, and the only
way to human freedom is through the reasonableness that
is the key to freedom.
Admittedly, this may be easier for the seven of us on the
Appellate Body than for all the assembled nations of the
world in all the various multilateral venues in which they
meet and deliberate and pontificate. For all our
differences, we seven are in many ways all alike. To borrow
trade terminology, the “process and production methods”
around the world that eventually brought the seven of us
together at our table in Geneva may have differed
considerably; yet the seven of us are very much “like
products.” Accordingly, the picture we each have of the
world is very much alike. If it were not, we would not have
been asked by the members of the WTO to sit together and
work together around our table.
And yet, as I picture the world, this is true as well of
different individuals and of different peoples throughout
the world. We are all very much “like products.” No
matter our nationality, no matter our ethnicity, no matter
our race, no matter our religion, no matter our sex or our
age or our circumstance, no matter the vast cultural and
other differences that may often divide us, we humans are,
nevertheless, all “like.” We are all alike in that we all share
a common kinship that transcends our many differences.
We are all part of the one circle of humanity.
In believing that there is one circle of humanity, in
believing that the true circle of humanity is a single circle
that includes all of humanity, in believing that, therefore,
our circle of humanity must be enlarged through continued
human progress to include all of humanity, Lecky did not
underestimate the persistence of culture as a challenge that
must be faced in the making of such progress. On the long,
solitary mountain walks he often took when he was not
reading and writing in his library, Lecky carried along in his
pocket a copy of Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the
Revolution in France. Like Burke, he was very much aware of
the importance of the “little platoons” of local cultures,
and of the challenges that the habits, the traditions, the
attitudes, and the very diversities of local cultures present
to the continued enlargement of the human circle.
Lecky shared Burke’s view that, “To be attached to the
subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in
society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public4
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affections.” It was perhaps for this reason that Lecky spent
so many years writing a history of Ireland that was notable
in particular for its defense of Irish culture. At the same
time, Lecky, like Burke, was of the view as well that, as
Burke went on to say in the very next sentence of his
famous reflections, the “little platoon” of our local
affections is “the first link in the series by which we
proceed towards a love to our country and to mankind.”
There must be other links beyond this first link that will
lead us to a broader range of duty and to a similar
allegiance to the larger circle of all of humanity.
This is seen clearly in Lecky’s attitude toward the
political relationship between Ireland and Britain. Like
Burke before him, Lecky was an Irish “Unionist.” He
favoured the continued union of Ireland and Britain, and
he did so at a time when many Irish patriots who shared
many of Lecky’s other views were moving ever closer
toward separation, and toward Irish independence. He
was, however, no less of an Irishman because of it. After all,
it was the Irish, not the British, who raised a statue of him
in Dublin.
Lecky hoped that Ireland and Britain would be able to
reason together in ways that would sustain their union. He
believed, as I do, that a crucial part of our likeness is the
capability we share as humans of reasoning together. This
is true for seven people. This is true for hundreds,
thousands, millions, or billions of people. This is true in
trade. This is true also in much else of mutual international




Reasonableness must be our approach in all our
continuing multilateral efforts to further trade. Multilateral
trade negotiation is one of the best opportunities we have
for employing reasonableness by reasoning together, and
multilateral trade liberalization through such negotiation is
one of the best ways we have to help enlarge the circle to
include all of humanity. Through the combined power of
cooperative reason in the WTO, the nations of the world
can continue to help free humanity through trade. Trade is
an essential means to the essential end of liberating
humanity so that we can all live together in freedom.
The connection between trade and freedom is one that
is both critical and often overlooked. Our dignity as
individual human beings depends on our ability to choose
our own destiny. Thus, freedom is about choosing.
Freedom is about having real choices about how to live.
The liberty that is freedom is about choosing for ourselves.
The French thinker Simone Weil once suggested, in The
Need for Roots, published in 1949, that, “Liberty, taking the
word in its concrete sense, consists in the ability to
choose.” Likewise, I would suggest that humanity, taken in
its truest and highest sense, consists in believing that other
people have the capacity to choose for themselves – if they
are given the choice. Accordingly, by multiplying choices,
by increasing the ability to choose, trade serves the end of
freedom, and thereby serves as well the goal of establishing
the single circle of all of humanity.
Reasonableness must likewise be our approach in all our
other multilateral efforts beyond trade. In addition to the
means of trade, other multilateral means are also needed to
serve the end of freedom. Other means are also needed to
help enlarge the circle of human sympathy to include all of
humanity. Expanding trade is only one way to expand
Lecky’s circle. There are others. There are numerous other
global concerns that demand global solutions if we are to
have any hope of changing all the numbing statistics of
world deprivation, and of having the full measure of both
freedom and humanity throughout the world.
Some of these concerns affect trade or otherwise relate
to trade. Others do not. The numbing statistics reveal
many global needs. The world is a circle of many truly
global concerns. These include – but, as we lawyers say, are
not limited to – human rights, women’s rights, the
environment, health, labor, intellectual property, invest-
ment, crime, corruption, and, of course, terrorism,
genocide, and all the other dire dilemmas that so urgently
demand cooperative acts of collective international security.
Our need for international law to address these and
other international concerns is great, and is greatly
increasing. But our awareness of our need for international
law, and of our need to establish and to abide by the
international rule of law, is not increasing. The
geographical distance between us seems to be diminishing,
but the other distances between us are not. Even as the
forces of “globalization” seem to be making our world
smaller, other forces are pulling us farther and farther apart.
When lecturing at Harvard Law School some time back,
I spoke at length about what I consider to be the significant
and positive contribution the WTO is making in
demonstrating to a skeptical world that there can be such
a thing as the international rule of law. Afterwards, one of
the bright students at Harvard asked me a question that I
confessed at the time I could not answer.
The question was this. In trade, independent nation-
states have a clear and compelling economic incentive to
cooperate in finding global, multilateral solutions. In the
WTO, mutual cooperation leads to greater mutual
prosperity. In WTO dispute settlement, a refusal to comply
with rules and rulings can lead to costly economic
sanctions. But where is the incentive for compliance with
international law in other areas of global concern – in areas
where there is not an obvious economic incentive, and
where there is not the economic leverage that there is to
help secure and ensure compliance in the WTO? It is
difficult enough to achieve consensus and compliance in
the WTO – where there is such leverage. How can we do
it elsewhere? 5





This is a very good question, to say the least. There are
about 30,000 pages of rules in the WTO treaty. There are
about 20,000 pages of rulings in WTO dispute settlement.
The members of the WTO comply with these rules and
with these rulings because they see it as in their self-
interest to do so. They want the trade concessions that are
secured by compliance. They do not want the trade
sanctions that can be the price of non-compliance. But
what about the other treaties besides the WTO treaty that
have been concluded by the nations of the world? And
what about all the additional treaties that the world still
needs to negotiate and conclude? What about, say, the
international agreement to combat terrorism that the
world has long discussed, but has not even come close to
concluding? Where is the incentive to comply with other
international laws that are not part of the WTO treaty, and
where is the leverage to enforce them?
I promised that bright young Harvard law student that I
would think about the answer to this question. I have
thought long and hard about it ever since. I have concluded
that my answer is the same as the answer that was given
long ago by William Edward Hartpole Lecky, who said
(Morals, vol I, at 13):
“He who seeks to improve the moral condition of mankind
has two, and only two, ways of accomplishing his end. The
first is, to make it more and more the interest of each to
conform to that of the others; the second is, to dispel the
ignorance which prevents men from seeing their true interest.”
Therefore, as Lecky saw it, there are only two ways to
further human progress. One is to find new ways to help us
cooperate with one another in our mutual self-interest –
such as through the WTO. The other is to find new ways
to help us educate and otherwise enlighten one another so
that we will be able to see our true self-interest.
The Oxford and Cambridge Club in London has a large
library filled with shelves and shelves of old books. On one
of the lofty shelves there, I found the two volumes of
another old book by Lecky, entitled History of the Rise and
Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe, which was
published in 1865. Fortunately, unlike “The Bookworm”
in Geneva, the library of the Oxford and Cambridge Club
has a tall ladder. So I climbed the ladder, pulled down the
dusty volumes, and spent the better part of a pleasant
afternoon sitting alone in the silence of the library and
reading more of what Lecky had to say about the
importance of seeing and serving our true self-interest.
(Although I was all alone in the library, in keeping with the
rules of the club, I wore a coat and a well-knotted tie while
I did so.)
Lecky acknowledged in the History of the Rise and Influence
of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe that there is a “bond of
intellectual sympathy” among some of us that inclines
some of us to desire to cooperate in our mutual self-
interest. Intellectually, rationally, logically, there are some
among us who want to work together in our mutual
interest. The difficulty is in doing so. Lecky’s solution to
this difficulty was to urge more of us to learn how to do so
by trying to do so. He maintained that:
“human nature is so constituted that it is impossible for
bodies of men to work together under the sense of a common
interest without a warm feeling of amity arising between
them. Common aims and hopes knit them together by a bond
of sympathy. Each man becomes accustomed to act with a
view to the welfare of others, and a union of affections usually
replaces or consecrates the union of interests.”
“BOND OF SYMPATHY”
One example illustrating the essential truth of Lecky’s
insight is my own experience on the Appellate Body, where
in my eight years I have seen first-hand how “common
aims and hopes” can knit individuals together in a “bond
of sympathy.” I have seen firsthand how a “union of
affections” can create and facilitate a “union of interests.”
In our work together for the members of the WTO, we
seven see ourselves, not as seven, but as one. We have seen
the Appellate Body as one from the very beginning.
My hope is that, long after I have left the Appellate Body,
those who serve on it will continue to see themselves as
one in their continued mutual efforts to serve the members
of the WTO. The members of the Appellate Body can
continue to achieve much by working together as one
toward the common goal of strengthening and sustaining
the WTO dispute settlement system as an international
institution that will serve all of the members of the WTO
equally and effectively. Much can be achieved by a mutual
commitment to the kind of real conversation that has always
made the Appellate Body think and act and serve as one.
Yet another example of the validity of Lecky’s insight is
the broader experience of first the contracting parties of
the GATT, and now of the members of the WTO.
Cooperation is based on trust. Trust builds on trust. Trust
is generated by interaction. Trust is based on habit, and not
merely on rational calculation. The trust that emerges from
the habit of working together is an example of what some
economists call “social capital” (see “A question of trust”,
The Economist, 22 February 2003, 22). The social capital
within the WTO is evidenced in the humdrum, day-to-day
working of the WTO-based world trading system that
rarely is referenced in the pages of the world’s press or in
the rhetoric of the world’s protests. The disputes that are
addressed by the Appellate Body are the rare exceptions in
a global trading system in which a mutual trust among the
members of the WTO largely prevails, and in which their
mutual trust contributes significantly to a considerable
mutual compliance with the agreed rules for trade.
By working together, the members of the WTO have
established the habit of working together. By establishing
the habit of compliance with WTO rules, they have
encouraged more compliance with WTO rules. Modern
mathematical game theorists call this “tit for tat.” Lecky6
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would simply have called this human nature. For the 146
members of the WTO, just as for the seven members of the
Appellate Body, the shared and sustained experience of
working together has created, and sustains, a “bond of
sympathy” and a “union of interests.” It does so now for
all the current 146 members of the WTO. Ultimately, it
can do so for all the world.
All the same, Lecky stressed that none of us, whether
individuals or nations, will want to engage in the real
conversation that can lead to real mutual trust unless we
believe that it is in our interest to do so. Altruism is
admirable. Altruism is not a fit or a firm foundation for
effective international law. There must be the perception of
a real interest to inspire the real conversation and the real
trust that, alone, can be the basis for real international law.
As Lecky explained in History of the Rise and Influence of the
Spirit of Rationalism in Europe, vol II, at 338:
“The bond of intellectual sympathy alone is far too weak to
restrain the action of colliding passions, and it was reserved
for political economy to supply a stronger and permanent
principle of unity. This principle is an enlightened self-
interest.”
By “political economy,” Lecky, a nineteenth-century
man, meant a policy aimed at attaining and maintaining the
nineteenth-century goal of freer trade. In his mid-
Victorian musings, he was echoing the views of Adam
Smith, David Ricardo, Richard Cobden, and their many
free-trade followers of his time. But this is also our goal in
our time. Lecky was also anticipating some of the
assumptions that are between the lines of the WTO treaty,
and that are taking the members of the WTO into the
twenty-first century.
One of those assumptions is that of a fixed and
unchanging human nature that focuses on self-interest, and
thus on the need to perceive, and to appeal to, an
enlightened self-interest. Lecky observed that:
“Taking human nature with all its defects, the influence of an
enlightened self-interest first of all upon the actions and
afterwards upon the character of mankind, is shown to be
sufficient to construct the whole edifice of civilisation; and if
that principle were withdrawn, all would crumble in the dust
(History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of
Rationalism in Europe, vol II, at 350).”
His emphasis on the need for an enlightened self-
interest was not in any way an original thought with Lecky.
Nor was it in any way an original thought with Smith,
Ricardo, Cobden, or others of his time who influenced his
Victorian thinking. There were many others who preceded
them in perceiving the importance and, indeed, the
indispensability, of an enlightened view of self-interest to
expanding the circle of human morality and, thus, human
sympathy. There have been many others who have
concluded, as Lecky did, that, without an enlightened view
of self-interest, civilization will “crumble in the dust.”
ENLIGHTENED VIEW OF SELF-INTEREST
An enlightened view of self-interest can, for example, be
seen as a key to Aristotle’s Politics. Like all classical Greeks,
Aristotle could not even conceive of a happy or a virtuous
life outside of the context of the mutually cooperative
framework of the Greek polis – the Greek city-state.
Likewise, and contrary to the common misconception of
many today, Adam Smith’s “moral sentiments” were much
more about cooperation than about competition. He saw
trade primarily as a way of cooperating, not of competing.
That is why he placed so much emphasis on the necessity
of a division of labor in his most famous book, The Wealth
of Nations. Moreover, the first paragraph of the first page of
the other, and often neglected, first book by that great
champion of the pursuit of self-interest, The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, is a ringing assertion of the centrality of the
bonds of human sympathy. Similarly, at the very center of
the thoughts of Alexis de Tocqueville on the possibilities for
human progress through the development of democratic
self-government is his belief that, in perceiving and
pursuing our self-interest, we must look both far ahead and
far afield; we must adhere to what he described as “the
principle of interest rightly understood”(see Democracy in
America, vol II, at 129).
And so on. In Christian ethics, in Muslim ethics, in
Jewish ethics, in Hindu ethics, in Buddhist ethics, in both
religious and secular thinking of all kinds in all parts of the
world and all through the centuries, there has been a
pervasive emphasis on perceiving and pursuing an
enlightened self-interest. In advocating adherence to an
enlightened view of self-interest, Lecky was merely
following in many other similar footsteps. Indeed, if there
is one common thread that runs through much of theology
and philosophy from antiquity to today – and that, I would
contend, has universal application for all of humanity today
and tomorrow – it is the common thread of the
indispensability of an enlightened self-interest to the
furthering of human progress and to the progressive
unfolding of an ever-expanding human morality and
human sympathy.
Thus, the answer to the question I was asked by the
student at Harvard about the future of international law is
found, not in the nuances of law itself, not in the
particulars of law per se, but in how we see our true self-
interest. And how we see our true self-interest depends on
how large we see the size of our circle. Do we really see
other people as part of our circle? Do we really see other
people in other parts of the world as part of our circle? Do
we really see their welfare and their well-being as part of
our self-interest? Do we wish for others what we wish for
ourselves? Are other people, whoever they may be,
wherever they may be, our neighbors? Are they our sisters
and our brothers? Or are they only our prey?
As Lecky suggested, the range of duty we see ourselves as
having to others is likewise the range of what we see as our 7





self-interest. It is also, as a consequence, the range of what
we see as our need for law. The long historical progression
from preying on others to trusting in others is a
progression away from might, and toward right. It is a
progressive expansion of our range of duty, and a
progressive enlargement of our circle of human sympathy.
It is the progression away from barbarism, and toward law.
It is the progression away from the rule of power, and
toward the rule of law.
We still have a long road to travel from power to law. In
particular, we still have a long way to go, we still have a long
way to progress, to reach and realize the international rule
of law. We have reached the point where nations feel
compelled to claim they are adhering to the international
rule of law. We have not yet reached the point where
nations necessarily always do so. Rhetorically, our range of
duty sometimes seems to include the whole world. But
realistically, it does not. And thus, legally, it does not,
because all too often what are described as “laws” that are
meant to fulfill the full extent of our duty to others
elsewhere in the world do not, realistically, have any real
meaning.
Why not? Why does power still so often prevail over
law? Why does the reality of the international rule of law
fall considerably short of our rhetorical commitment to the
international rule of law? The answer is in what we are able
to see. Like everything else of man’s devising, the law can
be considered an invention. The British philosopher Mary
Midgley, in Heart and Mind, has observed that the notion of
an invention is not an abstract notion; it has meaning only
“with reference to a given purpose. You can invent the
spinning jenny, or a more humane form of divorce, or the
notion of representative government, once you know that
you want them.”
This is equally so with the invention of law. Just as other
inventions occur only “once you know that you want
them,” so too does law occur only once you know that you
want law. For this reason, international law, like any other
law, will occur only once we know that we want it. But we
will not want law until we know that we need it. And we
will not need it until we see that we need it. And we will
not see that we need it while the size of our circle of human
sympathy remains smaller than the scope of the
international law that we need.
An example of a society that did not see the need for
invention was ancient Greece. The classical Greeks lived in
a world in which everything seemed to be new. They had
no precedents. They had no models. As a great British
historian of ancient Greece, the late Moses Finley, wrote, in
The Greeks, theirs was a situation of “compulsory
originality.” The Greeks responded to the challenge of this
situation with an originality that perhaps remains
unequaled. In virtually every emerging form of human
inquiry – including the scientific and mathematic pursuits
of astronomy, biology, physics, geometry, meteorology, and
more – the classical Greeks were pioneers of surpassing
originality.
Long before Einstein, Democritus advanced an atomic
theory of the universe. Long before Darwin, Anaximander
anticipated the theory of evolution. Long before
Copernicus and Galileo, Aristarchus argued that the earth
circles the sun. In these and numerous other ways, the
ancient Greeks demonstrated the reach of their originality.
And yet, as Finley noted, “[T]he list of Greek inventions is
a very short one indeed.”
There were several reasons for this. Because the Greeks
had slaves, they had less need for inventions. Because the
Greeks had an aristocratic tradition that valued leisure,
they had less interest in what we would consider as useful
work. Generally, they were content to engage in the
originality of their remarkable deductive reasoning; they
gave little thought to how the conclusions from their
reasoning might be used to improve materially the quality
of their daily lives.
The Greeks wanted to know, but for the most part they
did not see the need to use their knowledge for invention.
Theirs was what economists call a “bounded rationality”
(the phrase is that of the economist Timur Kuran. See Joel
Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic
Progress (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 154).
For all their considerable capabilities for reasoning, they
could not see beyond the bounds of the structure of their
own ancient world. In Finley’s judgment, (The Greeks, at
125):
“Apparently the society as a whole lacked the mentality and
the motivation to strive systematically for greater efficiency and
greater productivity … What was missing was an intangible
factor, a Baconian spirit which regularly and persistently turns
speculation into empirical research, empirical research into
practical application.”
Thus, as Lecky would remind us, the Greeks, too, had
their “hidden bias of imagination.” They did not share his
view – or our view – of human progress as involving
economic growth through the practical application of
innovative ideas in technological inventions. They did not
know that they wanted inventions. They did not know that
they needed them, because they did not see a need for
them. They could not imagine them.
We face the same challenge now. Today with respect to
international law, our own capabilities for reasoning – and
especially for reasoning together – are bounded by the
limits of our imagination. We cannot have the international
rule of law if we cannot imagine a world in which there is
the international rule of law. We cannot know that we need
it if we do not see the need for it. And we cannot see the
need for it if we cannot see as far as all of humanity. We
cannot see the need for the international rule of law if we
cannot see clearly enough to change the hidden bias of our
imagination.8
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Generally, with trade, we see our shared interest in
working together. Trade serves and strengthens our shared
interest. By its very nature as an act of exchange, trade is
an acknowledgment of a shared interest. In the multilateral
trading system that is served by the WTO, this shared
interest is reflected most clearly in the “most-favoured-
nation” principle that is at the very heart of the system. A
principle that provides that one trade concession made by
one WTO member to one other WTO member must also
be made to all other WTO members is a principle that,
above all else, acknowledges the shared interest of all WTO
members in securing the mutual benefits of trade.
Yet, even in trade, often we do not see the interest we
share. Thus, even in trade, we do not always serve our
shared interest as we should. In particular, even in trade,
we do not always see clearly enough our shared interest in
establishing and upholding the international rule of law.
More so, in areas of international concern other than
trade, often we are even less likely than we are in trade to
see our shared interest in the international rule of law.
Because we cannot see it, we cannot serve it. We cannot
advance the international rule of law in those other areas
of shared human concern because we cannot see beyond
the current limits of our imagination.
The circle of the ancient Greeks was enclosed by the
limits of their own thinking. They could not see beyond it.
All those who were not Greeks were barbarians. They
spoke the “bar-bar” of something other than Greek, and so
they were the outsiders. They were the “others.” They
were the foreigners who were beyond the limits of the
Greek circle. At the dawn of rational thought, the ultimate
implications of the profoundly original Greek thinking
were universal. Yet the limited size of the Greek circle kept
the Greeks from seeing the true extent of those
implications.
SEEING THE POTENTIAL OF LAW
So too with the way that many who profess to believe in
law see the supposed limits of law today. The way they see
the potential of law is limited by the way they see the limits
of their self-interest. Thomas Hobbes, a Londoner who
was a dedicated student of both the Greeks and self-
interest, told us long ago in Leviathan, “Covenants, without
the sword, are but Words …” Short of the sword, the only
other way to enforce the covenants we choose to call
“international law” is by seeing more than we see now. It
is by expanding the circle of our sight. It is by inspiring an
ever-expanding circle of enlightened self-interest. The
larger the circle, the larger the need we will see for
international law that is really “law,” and not merely
“words.”
Where international law is concerned, we live, like the
ancient Greeks, in a time of “compulsory originality.” And,
to be sure, we have no lack of originality among our legal
thinkers. We have no lack of legal theories that can have
practical application in a world much in need of
international law, and in need even more of the
international rule of law. What we lack is a sufficient
awareness in the world that real and inventive and practical
applications of international law are needed.
Those of us who believe we need “law” – and who
believe especially, and increasingly, that we need
“international law” – must understand above all what it is
that precedes “law.” Law is preceded by a perception of a
duty. Thus, an awareness of a duty precedes a willingness to
abide by a law. Law will exist only to the extent that we see
a need for law in fulfilling our “range of duty.” Law will
exist only to the extent that we see the need to be bound
by law.
In his book, Ways of Seeing, the British art critic John
Berger told us: “Seeing comes before words. The child
looks and recognizes before it can speak. But there is also
another sense in which seeing comes before words. It is
seeing which establishes our place in the surrounding
world…” As with art, so with law. Seeing comes before
words, and, thus, seeing comes before the words that
comprise the laws that place us all in the surrounding
world. For this reason, the foremost frontier in
international law is the frontier of what we see. It is the
frontier of what we see as our true self-interest. It is the
frontier that faces all of us who seek a surrounding world
in which there truly is international law.
Can we look beyond the grim reiteration of all the
numbing statistics of human degradation to see at last the
sheer human reality they represent? Can we look beyond
the mere numerical fact that there are 826 million people
in the developing countries of the world who suffer from
malnourishment to see the hunger of a single human being
somewhere in Asia? Can we look beyond the mere
numerical fact that there are 968 million people in the
developing countries of the world with no access to safe
drinking water from improved water resources to see the
thirst of a single human being somewhere in Africa? Can
we feel the sheer urgency of their hunger, their thirst, their
poverty, their deprivation, their desperation, if we do not
see it? And can we see it if we do not see and, thus, do not
acknowledge the basic humanity that each and every one of
them shares with us? Can we really treat them as anything
other than mere numbers, as anything other than mere
statistics, if we do not see each and every one of them as
part of our circle?
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations
provides that every treaty and every other international
agreement that is entered into by a Member State of the
United Nations shall be registered and published by the
United Nations Secretariat. The United Nations Treaty
Collection contains more than 40,000 treaties. Many of
these treaties are followed and upheld. But many are not.
Many are simply ignored in the day-to-day dealings and
doings of the nations of the world. 9





For all of the “international law” we have made as a
world, ours remains a world that is largely without
international law. We know a lot about how to negotiate
and conclude and sign and ratify and even register treaties.
We know a lot less about how to give them real meaning as
real law in the daily life of the world. We know a lot about
how to make international law. We know a lot less about
how to make international law work for all of us in the
large circle that includes all of those who are much in need
of international law all over the wide world.
Why is international law so often invoked but so
seldom obeyed? Why do sovereign nation-states so often
simply ignore international law and international
tribunals? They do so because they can, and they do so
because they do not see why they should not. Like the
ancient Greeks, their circle is too small. It is enclosed by
the limits of their own thinking. To expand their thinking,
to expand the domain of international law, the nations of
the world must expand the size of their circle. In a world
where there truly is international law, the circle of human
sympathy will truly be a circle that includes the whole
world.
Lecky was much taller than I am. He could reach the top
shelf. He was so “very tall” that, on the long walks they
often took together, he had to stoop over to hear the soft
voice of the aged Thomas Carlyle (see Fred Kaplan, Thomas
Carlyle: a Biography (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
press, 1983)). Lecky was tall enough to foresee the future.
Like many men, he grew more pessimistic as he grew older.
The glass that seemed half full in his youth seemed in his
later years to be half empty. Like some others of his time –
and like some also of our time (see Fareed Zakaria, The
Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New
York: WW Norton & Company, 2003) – Lecky worried
about extending the limits of liberal democracy out of fear
that doing so would lead to illiberal results. He feared that
too much democracy would result in too little freedom.
Yet, even in his old age, Lecky retained the optimistic belief
in human progress about which he wrote so eloquently in
his youth.
Later in life, Lecky wrote a multi-volume history of
eighteenth-century England, and also a multi-volume
history of eighteenth-century Ireland. These lengthy
narrative histories were widely read and widely praised at
the time. Even today, they are, on occasion, still read. But
it was his youthful book on the history of European morals
that was, of all his books, Lecky’s favorite. Perhaps this was
because it was in that early book that Lecky voiced the
most optimism about the future. It was in that youthful
distillation of all the hopes he held as he delved so deeply
into all the dusty shelves of all the musty libraries of Europe
that he saw most clearly the expanding circle of humanity.
It was also in his youth when Lecky first began to admire
and model himself after another nineteenth-century “man
of letters” who wrote about circles, Ralph Waldo Emerson.
Like me, Emerson was an American who never tired of
London. You can see this in every line of his collection of
essays about his visit to London and to England, English
Traits. Lecky was about 30 years younger than Emerson. To
my knowledge, they never met. But, in his youth, Lecky,
like me, read Emerson, and the Victorian historian from
Ireland was, like me, clearly much influenced by the
American sage from Concord.
Lecky’s histories were really extended philosophical
essays in a style reminiscent of Emerson’s own timeless
essays. Like the writings of Emerson, Lecky’s writings were
really lay sermons that sought to inspire a thoughtful
emulation. In his writing, and in his thinking, Lecky
admittedly emulated Emerson. Like Emerson, “he tried to
crystallize political wisdom in a single shining sentence.”
And, like Emerson, he saw the world as a world of circles
in which the range of what we see shapes the range of what
we do.
At some point in his youth, before writing his history of
European morals, Lecky must surely have read Emerson’s
essay entitled “Circles.” If so, it must have influenced his
own thinking, even as it has influenced mine. In that essay,
Emerson wrote:
“The life of man is a self-evolving circle which, from a ring
imperceptibly small, rushes on all sides outwards to new and
larger circles, and that without end ... The eye is the first
circle; the horizon which it forms is the second; and
throughout nature this primary figure is repeated without end
... Our life is an apprenticeship to the truth, that around
every circle another can be drawn … The one thing which we
seek with insatiable desire is … to draw a new circle …”
As Emerson taught us, our “invisible thought” makes
our visible world. As Lecky taught us, the “hidden bias” of
our imagination determines what is visible to us in the
world around us. For Emerson, for Lecky, and for me, the
question is one of what we can see. The size of our circle
depends on our eyes. It depends on our sight. It depends
on who and what and how far we can see across the
horizon.
Can we see anything beyond our own narrow-minded
and short-sighted selfishness? Can we see as far as next
door? Can we see as far as the farthest forgotten and
forsaken corner of our imperiled planet? Will we turn
inward? Will we turn our eyes away from the world? Or
will we turn outward toward the world, and to new and
larger circles, to circles without end?
From my seat in our small circle called the WTO
Appellate Body, from my front row seat on the frontier of
international law, I see an urgent need for a new and larger
circle. I see our apprenticeship to truth as ending only
when we finally discover the truth about our real interest
as individuals and as nations. I see our apprenticeship as
ending only when we clearly and finally see that our true
self-interest includes all of humanity.10
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Together, we must draw a new circle that embraces all
the world. Together, we must draw Lecky’s circle.
This article is taken from the lecture given by James
Bacchus at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on 10
April 2003.
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The author doubts whether the Council could survive another crisis
of the type witnessed in Kosovo and Iraq without change.
INTRODUCTION
The crisis of 2002–2003, leading up to the application
of military force against Iraq on 20 March 2003, raised
fundamental questions over the future of the Security
Council. From the American and British perspectives the
inability of the Council to agree on a process for handling
the Iraq crisis called into question the role, if any, to be
played by the Security Council in the future. From the
French perspective (and also probably from the Russian
and Chinese perspectives) the Iraq crisis strengthened the
Security Council, by showing that it will not simply agree
to the demands of the sole remaining superpower. The
principle seemingly being upheld by France, Russia and
China, was that using force to resolve long standing
problems should only occur once all diplomatic and non-
forcible efforts to resolve the matter had been exhausted.
It certainly seemed that the process of weapons inspection,
restarted after Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002, was
precipitously curtailed by military action.
Nevertheless, to paint the picture of a Council
protecting fundamental principles (the principle of the
non-use of force) in the Iraq crisis may seem a little rich,
given that, as with many other instances of Security
Council action and inaction, the application of principles
of law and justice is selective and inconsistent, being
dependent on the political configuration of Council
membership, particularly the P5 (five permanent
members), on any given issue. While the French
government can probably claim the moral and legal high
ground in the Iraq crisis in March 2003, how can it, along
with China, France, and also the UK, explain its
pragmatism in the case of voting for a US inspired
resolution granting immunity from the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to peacekeepers from certain
countries serving with the UN in July 2002? Of course,
pragmatists would argue that these are completely separate
issues, involving different issues of power and law. That is
certainly true, and it is to be expected in a political body.
The purpose here though, is not just to criticise the
Council for its inconsistency, but to suggest ways in which
the Council’s discretion in the maintenance of
international peace and security, and the discretion of each
permanent member in exercising the veto, can be
evaluated and perhaps regulated, so that principles of law
and justice play a more significant role in decision making
within the Council. Furthermore, the problem of inaction
